美國發布的《中國人權報告》和中國發布的《美國人權報告》

11 thoughts on “美國發布的《中國人權報告》和中國發布的《美國人權報告》”

1. 中國再一次利用美國一貫歪曲事實的報紙，成功的進行了一次反美革命活動

2. 美帝也挺恶心的，要真这么在乎人权 干嘛不在希拉里来华之前发布人权报告？

   现在是希拉里克林顿来华了，该谈的也谈了，该签的也签了
   已经勾结扎实了，然后迫于压力 故作姿态发个什么人权报告

   当然了，支国也明白，所以回嘴反咬两口，两大邪恶帝国联袂主演一场好戏给大家看

3. 回老哈：
   你这么说其实有些像民运诸君了，对美国挺怨妇样的
   杨恒均写的《美国不干涉中国内政，我们干涉》其实不错，不过自鄙人全家在挪威使馆审过之后，也颇自领会了点美国政客的心情：
   在国内反正一则不能太昧良心，中国乱来得说说，另一方面又反正得照顾美国企业家和连中国在哪里都不知道的青年人的考虑——反正中国在危害世界这个方面出了坑害价格以外，连输出革命的话都不敢再说。那么事实上，他们蓄辫缠足又怎么样？

4. 啊，不幸与民运雷同了……

   在我了解的概念中，老美的人权报告由来已久，支国对美的却历史不长。我记得某一年 就因为这个人权报告，支国差点受到制裁。

   支国的高层本以为，有中美经贸在，人权报告不过是虚张声势而已，不想那次差点擦枪走火……

   民主自由，在美帝嘴里 有时候是真的民主自由，有时候感觉根本就是个维护利益的借口……

   这个报告的内容 我没什么意见。主要是说美国处理这种事情的态度，不得不让人质疑其人权卫士的称号。

   事实上，没有美国 也就没有今天的民主。几乎所有国家的民主事业 都离不开美国的支持了
   那不有句话吗？如果美国衰落了，西方就跟着衰落了，整个自由世界就衰落了

   另：阿提拉君要移民挪威了吗？恭喜

5. If America falls, Europe falls. The West falls, we fall. – Oriana Fallaci
   就是此話罷
   那是鄙人父母的決定，敢明天寫點東西介紹下挪威，發現那里蠻有趣的——中國孫大炮的時候，他們（以后就是我真正的“母國”啦）竟然投票選皇帝回來！

6. 啊，就是这句。

   挪威，恩，神秘的国度，对其历史完全不了解了
   到时候看看阿提拉君的博客 长长见识

7. 今年的也都出了。

8. 去找来更新一下吧

9. 2009 human rights report: China

   BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR

   2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
   March 11, 2010

   (The section for Tibet, the report for Hong Kong, and the report for Macau are appended below.)
   The People’s Republic of China (PRC), with a population of approximately 1.3 billion, is an authoritarian state in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constitutionally is the paramount source of power. Party members hold almost all top government, police, and military positions. Ultimate authority rests with the 25-member political bureau (Politburo) of the CCP and its nine-member standing committee. Hu Jintao holds the three most powerful positions as CCP general secretary, president, and chairman of the Central Military Commission. Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces.

   The government’s human rights record remained poor and worsened in some areas. During the year the government increased the severe cultural and religious repression of ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR).Tibetan areas remained under tight government controls. The detention and harassment of human rights activists increased, and public interest lawyers and law firms that took on cases deemed sensitive by the government faced harassment, disbarment and closure. The government limited freedom of speech and controlled the Internet and Internet access. Abuses peaked around high-profile events, such as the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square uprising, the 50th anniversary of the Tibetan uprising, and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

   As in previous years, citizens did not have the right to change their government. Other serious human rights abuses included extrajudicial killings, executions without due process, torture and coerced confessions of prisoners, and the use of forced labor, including prison labor. The government continued to monitor, harass, detain, arrest, and imprison journalists, writers, dissidents, activists, petitioners, and defense lawyers and their families, many of whom sought to exercise their rights under the law. A lack of due process and restrictions on lawyers, particularly human rights and public interest lawyers, had serious consequences for defendants who were imprisoned or executed following proceedings that fell short of international standards. The party and state exercised strict political control of courts and judges, conducted closed trials, and continued the use of administrative detention. Prolonged illegal detentions at unofficial holding facilities, known as black jails, were widespread.

   Individuals and groups, especially those deemed politically sensitive by the government, continued to face tight restrictions on their freedom to assemble, practice religion, and travel. The government failed to protect refugees and asylum-seekers adequately, and the detention and forced repatriation of North Koreans continued. The government increased pressure on other countries to repatriate citizens back to China, including citizens who were being processed by UNHCR as political refugees. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), both local and international, continued to face intense scrutiny and restrictions. The government failed to address serious social conditions that affected human rights, including endemic corruption, trafficking in persons, and discrimination against women, minorities, and persons with disabilities. The government continued its coercive birth limitation policy, in some cases resulting in forced abortion or forced sterilization. Workers cannot choose an independent union to represent them in the workplace, and the law does not protect workers’ right to strike.

   In April the government unveiled its first National Human Rights Action Plan. The 54-page document outlined human rights goals to be achieved over the next two years and addressed issues such as prisoners’ rights and the role of religion in society. However, the plan has not yet been implemented.

   On July 5, riots broke out in Urumqi, the provincial capital of Xinjiang, after police used force to break up a demonstration reportedly composed mostly of Uighur university students who protested the killing of Uighur migrant workers by Han co-workers in Guangdong Province. Violence erupted leaving approximately 200 people dead and 1,700 injured. According to official sources, most of the dead were Han Chinese. On July 7 and September 4, groups of Han Chinese engaged in retaliatory violence, resulting in more deaths. At year’s end Urumqi remained under a heavy police presence and most Internet and international phone communication remained cut off.
   RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
   Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:
   a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
   During the year security forces reportedly committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. No official statistics on deaths in custody were available.
   In January Lin Guoqiang died suddenly while in custody at the Fuqing Detention Center in Fujian Province. His family claimed that his body was swollen and covered with bruises. At year’s end there was no official investigation into the case.
   On February 8, Li Qiaoming was reportedly beaten to death in a detention center in Jinning County, Yunnan Province. Prison officials initially claimed he died after accidentally running into a wall during a game of “hide and seek.” However, Li’s father, who viewed the corpse, reported Li’s head was swollen and his body covered with purple abrasions. Following Li’s death, public security officials launched a campaign to eliminate “unnatural deaths” in prisons. An investigation determined three inmates were responsible for the death. The inmates, along with two prison guards, were sentenced to prison.
   In March Li Wenyan died while in custody in Jiujiang, Jiangxi Province. The Xinhua official press quoted a senior prison official as stating that Li died while having a “nightmare.” Official press reports also stated that an autopsy performed by the Jiangxi Provincial Public Security Department in May showed that Li died of various diseases, including an ulcer, an abscess, and heart disease, none of which were discovered until after his death. The same press report stated that an injury on the body was caused by electric shock administered during resuscitation attempts.
   Also in March Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that a Tibetan monk, Phuntsok Rabten, was beaten to death by police in Sichuan Province after urging Tibetans to boycott farming to protest a massive security clampdown.
   In April the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) disclosed that at least 15 prisoners died in “unnatural deaths” under unusual circumstances during the year. According to a Chinese press report, seven of the prisoners died of beatings, three were classified as suicides, two were described as accidents, and three remained under investigation.
   According to official media reports, 197 persons died and 1,700 were injured during the July 5 rioting in Urumqi. A second wave of riots, on a smaller scale, occurred on July 7. On September 25, charges were brought against 21 of the more than 200 persons facing prosecution in connection with the riots. On November 9, eight Uighurs and one Han were executed without due process for crimes committed during July riots. At year’s end 22 persons had been sentenced to death; five others reportedly received suspended death sentences. Of these, one was reported to be ethnically Han Chinese and the rest were Uighurs.
   According to RFA reports, police detained Uighur Shohret Tursun in Urumqi during the July 5 riots. In September police returned his disfigured body to family members and ordered them to bury him; the family refused to do so without an explanation of his death from the police. On September 20, the police surrounded the family home and forced the family to bury the body without an autopsy.

   During the reporting period no new information became available regarding the deaths of Falun Gong practitioner Yu Zhou, who was arrested in Beijing in January 2008 and died in February 2008; Tibetan protester Paltsal Kyab, detained in April 2008 in Sichuan Province and who died in police custody in May 2008; or a motorcyclist surnamed Ouyang, who died in July 2008 and was allegedly killed by security guards in Guangdong Province.

   During the year no new information was available regarding a 2007 incident in which 18 persons were killed and 17 were arrested during a raid at a location in the XUAR that officials called a terrorist training camp.

   Defendants in criminal proceedings were executed following convictions that sometimes took place under circumstances involving severe lack of due process and inadequate channels for appeal.
   b. Disappearance
   On February 4, authorities detained human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, who had represented Chinese Christians and Falun Gong practitioners. At year’s end his whereabouts remained unconfirmed, although according to NGO reports, in August he reportedly was seen in his hometown under heavy police escort. Before his arrest Gao published a letter detailing his torture during a previous period of detention.
   On March 30, underground Catholic bishop Julius Jia Zhiguo of Zhengding, Hebei Province, was arrested; at year’s end his whereabouts were unknown. The whereabouts of underground Catholic priests Zhang Li and Zhang Jianlin, from near Zhangjiakou city in Hebei Province, whom authorities detained in May 2008, and Wu Qinjing, the bishop of Zhouzhi, Shaanxi Province, who was detained in 2007, also remained unknown.
   In an October report, the NGO Human Rights Watch documented the disappearances of hundreds of Uighur men and boys following the July protests in Urumqi.
   At year’s end the government had not provided a comprehensive, credible accounting of all those killed, missing, or detained in connection with the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations. In October the Dui Hua Foundation estimated that approximately 20 individuals continued to serve sentences for offenses committed during the demonstration.
   c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
   The law prohibits the physical abuse of detainees and forbids prison guards from extracting confessions by torture, insulting prisoners’ dignity, and beating or encouraging others to beat prisoners. However, during the year there were reports that officials used electric shocks, beatings, shackles, and other forms of abuse.
   According to a November Human Rights Watch report, on March 6, An Weifeng was released on bail from Bancheng prison in Chengde City, Henan Province, for medical treatment. His father claimed that An Weifeng’s body was swollen and scarred as a result of beatings and the administration of electric shocks.
   In 2007, 30 farmers from Chengdu, Sichuan Province, who traveled to Beijing seeking resolution of a land dispute were abducted and taken to a military base, where they were tortured, threatened, and starved. One of them allegedly attempted suicide, “because (the guards) didn’t allow me to sleep or eat in order to force me to write self-criticisms.” According to the same report, a 15-year-old girl who traveled to Beijing to get help for her disabled father was kidnapped and taken back to Gansu Province, where she was beaten and held incommunicado for nearly two months. There were no new developments in this case during the year.

   In November 2008 the UN Committee Against Torture (UNCAT) stated its deep concern about the routine and widespread use of torture and mistreatment of suspects in police custody, especially to extract confessions or information used in criminal proceedings. However, UNCAT acknowledged government efforts to address the practice of torture and related problems in the criminal justice system. Many alleged acts of torture occurred in pretrial criminal detention centers or Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) centers. Sexual and physical abuse and extortion occurred in some detention centers.
   According to China News Weekly, the country had 22 “ankang” institutions (high-security psychiatric hospitals for the criminally insane) directly administered by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). Political activists, underground religious believers, persons who repeatedly petitioned the government, members of the banned Chinese Democracy Party (CDP), and Falun Gong adherents were among those housed with mentally ill patients in these institutions. The regulations for committing a person to an ankang facility were not clear, and detainees had no mechanism for objecting to public security officials’ determinations of mental illness. Patients in these hospitals reportedly were given medicine against their will and forcibly subjected to electric shock treatment. Activists sentenced to administrative detention also reported they were strapped to beds or other devices for days at a time, beaten, forcibly injected or fed medications, and denied food and use of toilet facilities.
   Prison and Detention Center Conditions
   Conditions in penal institutions for both political prisoners and common criminals generally were harsh and often degrading. Prisoners and detainees often were kept in overcrowded conditions with poor sanitation. Inadequate prison capacity remained a problem in some areas. Food often was inadequate and of poor quality, and many detainees relied on supplemental food and medicines provided by relatives; some prominent dissidents were not allowed to receive such goods.
   On March 2, an inmate at the Danzhou First Detention Center in Hainan was beaten to death by inmates while guards looked on.
   Forced labor remained a serious problem in penal institutions. Many prisoners and detainees in penal and RTL facilities were required to work, often with no remuneration. Information about prisons, including associated labor camps and factories, was considered a state secret and was tightly controlled.
   In August Vice Minister of Health Huang Jiefu stated that inmates were not a proper source for organ transplants, that prisoners must give written consent for their organs to be taken, and that their rights were protected. In a 2007 interview, Ministry of Health spokesman Mao Qunan stated that most transplanted organs were from executed prisoners.
   Adequate, timely medical care for prisoners remained a serious problem, despite official assurances that prisoners have the right to prompt medical treatment. Prison officials often denied privileges, including the ability to purchase outside food, make telephone calls, and receive family visits to those who refused to acknowledge guilt.
   Conditions in administrative detention facilities, such as RTL camps, were similar to those in prisons. Beating deaths occurred in administrative detention and RTL facilities. According to NGO reports, conditions in these facilities were similar to those in prisons, with detainees reporting beatings, sexual assaults, lack of proper food, and no access to medical care.
   The law requires juveniles to be held separately from adults, unless facilities are insufficient. In practice children sometimes were held with adult prisoners and required to work. Political prisoners were segregated from each other and placed with common criminals, who sometimes beat political prisoners at the instigation of guards. Newly arrived prisoners or those who refused to acknowledge committing crimes were particularly vulnerable to beatings.
   The government generally did not permit independent monitoring of prisons or RTL camps, and prisoners remained inaccessible to local and international human rights organizations, media groups, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
   d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
   Arbitrary arrest and detention remained serious problems. The law permits police and security authorities to detain persons without arresting or charging them. Because the government tightly controlled information, it was impossible to determine accurately the total number of persons subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.
   Role of the Police and Security Apparatus
   The security apparatus is made up of the Ministries of State Security and Public Security, the People’s Armed Police, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the state judicial, procuratorial, and penal systems. The Ministries of State Security and Public Security and the People’s Armed Police were responsible for internal security. SPP and Supreme People’s Court (SPC) officials admitted that courts and prosecutors often deferred to the security ministries on policy matters and individual cases. The SPP was responsible for the investigation of corruption and duty crimes (crimes committed by public officials or state functionaries, including corruption, crimes of dereliction of duty, and crimes involving violations of a citizen’s personal rights). The PLA was responsible for external security but also had some domestic security responsibilities.
   The MPS coordinates the country’s law enforcement, which is administratively organized into local, county, provincial, and specialized police agencies. Some efforts were made to strengthen historically weak regulation and management of law enforcement agencies; however, judicial oversight was limited, and checks and balances were absent. Corruption at the local level was widespread. Security officials, including “urban management” officials, reportedly took individuals into custody without just cause, arbitrarily collected fees from individuals charged with crimes, and mentally and physically abused victims and perpetrators.
   The SPP acknowledged continuing widespread abuse in law enforcement. Domestic news media reported the convictions of public security officials who had beaten to death suspects or prisoners in their custody. On August 12, Deng Hongfei, a police officer in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, was sentenced to 12 years in prison, and fellow officer Xia Xiangdong was sentenced to one year in prison for beating to death suspect Wang Jianguo during an interrogation in 2006.
   Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention
   Public security organs do not require court-approved warrants to detain suspects under their administrative detention powers. After detention the procuracy can approve formal arrest without court approval. According to the law, in routine criminal cases police can unilaterally detain persons for up to 37 days before releasing them or formally placing them under arrest. After a suspect is arrested, the law allows police and prosecutors to detain a person for up to seven months while public security organs further investigate the case. Another 45 days of detention are allowed where public security organs refer a case to the procuratorate to decide whether to file charges. If charges are filed, authorities can detain a suspect for an additional 45 days between filing and trial. In practice the police sometimes detained persons beyond the time limits stipulated by law. In some cases investigating security agents or prosecutors sought repeated extensions, resulting in pretrial detention of a year or longer. The criminal procedure law allows detainees access to lawyers before formal charges are filed, although police often limited such access.
   The criminal procedure law requires a court to provide a lawyer to a defendant who has not already retained a lawyer; who is blind, deaf, mute, a minor; or who may be sentenced to death. This law applies whether or not the defendant is indigent. Courts may also provide lawyers to other criminal defendants who cannot afford them, although courts often did not appoint counsel in such circumstances.
   Detained criminal suspects, defendants, their legal representatives, and close relatives are entitled to apply for bail; however, in practice few suspects were released on bail pending trial.
   The government used incommunicado detention. The law requires notification of family members within 24 hours of detention, but individuals often were held without notification for significantly longer periods, especially in politically sensitive cases. Under a sweeping exception, officials were not required to provide notification if doing so would “hinder the investigation” of a case. In some cases police treated those with no immediate family more severely.
   There were numerous reports of citizens who were detained with no or severely delayed notice. On July 27, Noor-Ul-Islam Sherbaz, a Uighur minor, was detained and accused of participating in the July 5 riot. In contravention of law on the detention of juveniles, Sherbaz’s parents had no contact with him after his arrest and were not allowed to be present during police interrogations.
   Authorities advised a number of activists in Shanghai and Beijing to remain at home in the days prior to and during U.S. President Obama’s November visit to China. Some activists in provinces outside these two cities were told not to travel outside their province.
   Citizens who traveled to Beijing to petition the central government for redress of a grievance were frequently subjected to arbitrary detention, often by police from the petitioner’s hometown. Some provincial governments operated detention centers in Beijing or in other localities to hold such petitioners without official procedures or right to appeal. The law protects the right to petition the government for resolution of grievances.
   In August a guard raped a 20-year-old petitioner at a detention facility operated at a Beijing hotel by officials from Tonbai County in Henan Province. In November the guard pled guilty to raping the woman and in December was convicted and sentenced to eight years in prison. Petitioners frequently were forcibly returned to their hometowns after stays in detention facilities lasting several days to several weeks. According to an International Herald Tribune report, Huang Liuhong, a woman from Guizhou Province, was held in a Beijing detention facility for nearly a year.
   The law permits nonjudicial panels, called labor reeducation panels, to sentence persons without trial to three years in RTL camps or other administrative detention programs. The labor reeducation committee is authorized to extend a sentence up to one year. Defendants could challenge RTL sentences under the administrative litigation law and appeal for a reduction in, or suspension of, their sentences. However, appeals rarely succeeded. Many other persons were detained in similar forms of administrative detention, known as “custody and education” (for women engaged in prostitution and those soliciting prostitution) and “custody and training” (for minors who committed crimes). Administrative detention was used to intimidate political activists and prevent public demonstrations.
   On February 1, Zhu Lijin was arrested for distributing Falun Gong pamphlets. She was sentenced to 15 months in RTL without a trial. Authorities used special reeducation centers to prolong detention of Falun Gong practitioners who had completed terms in RTL.
   Authorities arrested persons on allegations of revealing state secrets, subversion, and other crimes as a means to suppress political dissent and social advocacy. Citizens also were also detained under broad and ambiguous state secrets laws for, among other actions, disclosing information on criminal trials, meetings, and government activity.
   Human rights activists, journalists, unregistered religious figures, and former political prisoners and their family members were among those targeted for arbitrary detention or arrest.
   The government continued to use house arrest as a nonjudicial punishment and control measure against dissidents, former political prisoners, family members of political prisoners, petitioners, underground religious figures, and others it deemed politically sensitive. Numerous dissidents, activists, and petitioners were placed under house arrest during the October 1 National Day holiday period. House arrest encompassed varying degrees of stringency but sometimes included complete isolation in one’s home or another location under lock and guard. In some cases house arrest involved constant monitoring, but persons under house arrest were occasionally permitted to leave the home to work or run errands. Sometimes such persons were required to ride in the vehicles of their police monitors when venturing outside. When outside the home, subjects of house arrest were usually, but not always, under surveillance. In some instances security officials assumed invasive positions within the family home rather than monitor from the outside.
   On May 31, police at Guiyang Airport apprehended human rights activist Chen Xi as he was attempting to fly to Beijing to commemorate the Tiananmen uprising. He was detained for nine hours without explanation and then sent home, where he remained under house arrest. Chen was again detained on December 7, presumably to prevent him from attending the Guizhou Human Rights Symposium, which he helped organize. In February Shanghai activist Dai Xuezhong was prohibited from leaving his home for approximately one week by local police to prevent a planned meeting with fellow activist Deng Yongliang. In August authorities placed writer Zhao Hun, who blogs under the name ofMo Zhixu, under house arrest for several days.
   At year’s end Yuan Weijing, wife of imprisoned family-planning activist lawyer Chen Guangcheng, remained under virtual house arrest. According to Reporters Without Borders, when journalism professor Wang Keqin and a student tried to visit Yuan in March in Linyi County, Shandong Province, both were physically and verbally assaulted by five or six plainclothes individuals, who Wang reportedly claimed were hired by the local government to prevent visitors to Chen’s family.
   Police continued the practice of placing under surveillance, harassing, and detaining citizens around politically sensitive events, including the plenary sessions of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC and the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square student uprising. In early June authorities in Hangzhou placed several dissidents, including Charter 08 signatories Wen Kejian and Zou Wei and CDP activist Zhu Yufu, under house arrest for several days. Published in December 2008, Charter 08 calls for free elections and greater freedom of speech. Coauthored by Liu Xiaobo, who was later imprisoned, the document, originally signed by more than 300 Chinese activists and intellectuals, received more than 7,000 signatories online. Many dissidents in Beijing reported that police prevented them from leaving their houses on June 4, the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Authorities in the XUAR used house arrest and other forms of arbitrary detention against those accused of subscribing to the “three evils” of religious extremism, “splittism,” and terrorism. Raids, detentions, arrests, and judicial punishments indiscriminately affected not only those suspected of supporting terrorism but also those who peacefully sought to pursue political goals or worship.

   e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
   The law states that the courts shall exercise judicial power independently, without interference from administrative organs, social organizations, and individuals. However, in practice the judiciary was not independent. It received policy guidance from both the government and the CCP, whose leaders used a variety of means to direct courts on verdicts and sentences, particularly in politically sensitive cases. At both the central and local levels, the government and CCP frequently interfered in the judicial system and dictated court decisions. Trial judges decided individual cases under the direction of the adjudication committee in each court. In addition, the CCP’s law and politics committee, which includes representatives of the police, security services, procuratorate, and courts, had the authority to review and influence court operations at all levels of the judiciary. People’s congresses also had authority to alter court decisions, but this happened rarely.
   Corruption often influenced judicial decision making, and safeguards against corruption were vague and poorly enforced. Local governments appointed judges at the corresponding level of the judicial structure. Judges received their court finances and salaries from these government bodies and could be replaced by them. Local authorities often exerted undue influence over the judges they appointed and financed. Several high-profile corruption cases involved procuracy officials.
   Courts lacked the independence and authority to rule on the constitutionality of laws. The law permits organizations or individuals to question laws and regulations they believe contradict the constitution, but a constitutional challenge first requires consultation with the body drafting the questioned regulation and can be appealed only to the NPC. Accordingly, lawyers had little or no opportunity to use the constitution in litigation.
   The SPC is followed in descending order by the higher, intermediate, and basic people’s courts. These courts handle criminal, civil, and administrative cases, including appeals of decisions by police and security officials to use RTL and other forms of administrative detention. There were special courts for handling military, maritime, and railway transport cases.
   The CCP used a form of discipline known as “shuang gui” for violations of party discipline, but there were reports of its use against nonparty members. Shuang gui is similar to house arrest, can be authorized without judicial involvement or oversight, and requires the CCP member under investigation to submit to questioning at a designated place and time. According to regulations of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission governing shuang gui, corporal punishment is banned, the member’s dignity must be respected, and he or she is regarded as a comrade unless violations are proved. Absent any legal oversight, it is unclear how these regulations were enforced in practice.
   On August 12, authorities in Chengdu closed the trial of Tan Zuoren, charged with defaming the CCP, from the public (see Political Prisoners section). Tan attempted to collect the names of students who died in the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Police blocked persons who tried to attend the proceedings at the courthouse. When contemporary artist and civil society activist Ai Weiwei traveled to Chengdu to participate in the trial and testify on Tan’s behalf, security forces beat him and prevented him from leaving his hotel room until the trial had adjourned.
   On November 6, 70-year-old Lin Dagang was sentenced to two years in prison for illegally possessing state secrets. According to an NGO report, his wife and son were not allowed to attend his two-hour trial.
   On December 25, Liu Xiaobo, a well-known dissident and coauthor of Charter 08, which called for increased political freedoms and human rights in China, was found guilty of the crime of inciting subversion of state power and sentenced to 11 years in prison and two years’ deprivation of political rights, in a trial that was believed to contain serious due process violations. At year’s end Liu’s case was on appeal.

   Trial Procedures
   Trials took place before a judge, who often was accompanied by “people’s assessors,” laypersons hired by the court to assist in decision making. According to law, people’s assessors had authority similar to judges, but in practice they often deferred to judges and did not exercise an independent jury-like function.
   There was no presumption of innocence, and the criminal justice system was biased toward a presumption of guilt, especially in high-profile or politically sensitive cases. The combined conviction rate for first- and second-instance criminal trials was more than 99 percent in 2008; 1,008,677 defendants were tried, and 1,373 were found not guilty. In many politically sensitive trials, which rarely lasted more than several hours, the courts handed down guilty verdicts immediately following proceedings. Courts often punished defendants who refused to acknowledge guilt with harsher sentences than those who confessed. There was an appeals process, but appeals rarely resulted in reversed verdicts. Appeals processes failed to provide sufficient avenues for review, and there were inadequate remedies for violations of defendants’ rights.
   SPC regulations require all trials to be open to the public, with certain exceptions, such as cases involving state secrets, privacy, and minors. Authorities used the legal exception for cases involving state secrets to keep politically sensitive proceedings closed to the public and sometimes even to family members, and to withhold access to defense counsel. Under the regulations, foreigners with valid identification are allowed the same access to trials as citizens, but in practice foreigners were permitted to attend court proceedings by invitation only. As in past years, foreign diplomats and journalists sought permission to attend a number of trials only to have court officials reclassify them as “state secret” cases, fill all available seats with security officials, or otherwise close them to the public. For example, foreign diplomats requested but were denied permission to attend human rights advocate Huang Qi’s February trial on charges of illegally possessing state secrets. Huang’s trial was adjourned without a verdict. Some trials were broadcast, and court proceedings were a regular television feature. A few courts published their verdicts on the Internet.
   The law gives most suspects the right to seek legal counsel shortly after their initial detention and interrogation, although police frequently interfered with this right. Individuals who face administrative detention do not have the right to seek legal counsel. Human rights lawyers reported that they were denied the ability to defend certain clients or threatened with punishment if they did.
   Both criminal and administrative cases remained eligible for legal aid, although 70 percent or more of criminal defendants went to trial without a lawyer. According to the Ministry of Justice, the number of legal-aid cases reached 546,859 in 2008. The country had 12,778 full-time legal aid personnel, although the number of legal-aid personnel remained inadequate to meet demand. Nonattorney legal advisors provided the only legal-aid options in many areas.
   Lawyers often refused to represent defendants in politically sensitive cases, and defendants frequently found it difficult to find an attorney. The government took steps to discourage lawyers from taking sensitive cases. For example, following the July unrest in the XUAR, the Beijing Municipal Judicial Bureau posted a note on its Web site urging justice bureaus, the Beijing Municipal Lawyers Association, and law firms in Beijing to “exercise caution” in representing cases related to the riots. Similar measures were taken with respect to Tibetan defendants. In some cases Beijing-based rights lawyers were told they could not represent jailed Tibetans. Local governments in the XUAR and Tibetan areas imposed arbitrary rules that defendants could be represented only by locally registered attorneys.
   When defendants were able to retain counsel in politically sensitive cases, government officials sometimes prevented effective representation of counsel. Officials deployed a wide range of tactics to obstruct the work of lawyers representing sensitive clients, including unlawful detentions, disbarment, intimidation, refusal to allow a case to be tried before a court, and physical abuse. For example, in April Beijing lawyer Cheng Hai was attacked and beaten while on his way to meet with a Falun Gong client in Chengdu. According to Cheng, those responsible for the attack were officials from the Jinyang General Management Office, Wuhou District, Chengdu. In May police officers in Chongqing arrested and beat lawyers Zhang Kai and Li Chunfu when they interviewed the family of a Falun Gong practitioner who allegedly died in police custody.
   During its yearly professional evaluation procedures for Beijing attorneys, the Beijing Lawyers Association did not renew the professional licenses of a number of human rights lawyers, effectively barring them from practicing law, including Li Heping, Cheng Hai, Jiang Tianyong, Li Xiongbing, Li Chunfu, Wang Yajun, Tang Jitian, Yang Huimin, Xie Yanyi, Li Dunyong, Wen Haibo, Liu Wei, Zhang Lihui, Peng Jian, Li Jinglin, Lan Zhixue, Zhang Kai, and Liu Xiaoyuan. Two lawyers who practiced outside of Beijing, Wei Liangyue and Yang Zaixin, reported that authorities warned them that their licenses were in jeopardy. Shanghai lawyers Zheng Enchong and Guo Guoting lost their licenses in 2008 in a similar decision and, as a result, were barred from practicing law.
   According to the law, defense attorneys can be held responsible if their client commits perjury, and prosecutors and judges have wide discretion to decide what constitutes perjury. In some sensitive cases, lawyers had no pretrial access to their clients, and defendants and lawyers were not allowed to speak during trials. In practice criminal defendants often were not assigned an attorney until a case was brought to court. Even in nonsensitive criminal trials, only one in seven defendants reportedly had legal representation.
   The mechanism that allows defendants to confront their accusers was inadequate; the percentage of witnesses who came to court in criminal cases was less than 10 percent and as low as 1 percent in some courts. According to one expert, only 1 to 5 percent of trials involved witnesses. In most criminal trials, prosecutors read witness statements, which neither the defendants nor their lawyers had an opportunity to question. Approximately 95 percent of witnesses in criminal cases did not appear in court to testify, sometimes due to hardship or fear of reprisals. Although the criminal procedure law states that pretrial witness statements cannot serve as the sole basis for conviction, officials relied heavily on such statements to support their cases. Defense attorneys had no authority to compel witnesses to testify or to mandate discovery, although they could apply for access to government-held evidence relevant to their case. In practice pretrial access to information was minimal, and the defense often lacked adequate opportunity to prepare for trial.
   Police and prosecutorial officials often ignored the due process provisions of the law, which led to particularly egregious consequences in death penalty cases. By law there are at least 68 capital offenses, including nonviolent financial crimes such as counterfeiting currency, embezzlement, and corruption.
   In 2007 the SPC reassumed jurisdiction to conduct final review of death penalty cases handed down for immediate execution (but not death sentences handed down with a two-year reprieve). In most cases the SPC does not have authority to issue a new decision or declare a defendant innocent if it discovers errors in the original judgment; it can only approve or disapprove lower-court decisions. SPC spokesman Ni Shouming stated that since reassuming the death penalty review power in 2007, the SPC had rejected 15 percent of the cases it reviewed due to unclear facts, insufficient evidence, inappropriateness of the death sentence in some cases, and inadequate trial procedures. The SPC remanded these cases to lower courts for further proceedings, although it did not provide underlying statistics or figures. Because official statistics remained a state secret, it was not possible to evaluate independently the implementation and effects of the procedures.
   Following the SPC’s resumption of death penalty review power, executions were not to be carried out on the date of conviction, but only after final review by the SPC was completed. The government continued to apply the death penalty in a range of cases, including cases of economic crimes. In April a Beijing court upheld the death sentence of Yang Yanming, who was convicted of embezzlement. Yang was executed on December 8. On August 7, Li Peiying, former chairman of the Beijing Capital International Airport, was executed for bribery. On December 29, British citizen Akmal Shaikh was executed for drug-trafficking crimes.
   The foreign-based Dui Hua Foundation estimated that approximately 5,000 persons were executed during the year.
   Political Prisoners and Detainees
   Government officials continued to deny holding any political prisoners, asserting that authorities detained persons not for their political or religious views but because they violated the law; however, the authorities continued to confine citizens for reasons related to politics and religion. Tens of thousands of political prisoners remained incarcerated, some in prisons and others in RTL camps or administrative detention. The government did not grant international humanitarian organizations access to political prisoners.
   Foreign NGOs estimated that several hundred persons remained in prison for the crime of “counterrevolution,” repealed in 1997, and thousands of others were serving sentences under the state security law, which authorities stated covers crimes similar to counterrevolution. Foreign governments urged the government to review the cases of those charged before 1997 with counterrevolution and to release those who had been jailed for nonviolent offenses under provisions of the criminal law, which were eliminated when the law was revised. At year’s end no systematic review had occurred. The government maintained that prisoners serving sentences for counterrevolution and endangering state security were eligible on an equal basis for sentence reduction and parole, but political prisoners benefited from early release at lower rates than those enjoyed by other prisoners. Dozens of persons were believed to remain in prison in connection with their involvement in the 1989 Tiananmen prodemocracy movement. International organizations estimated that at least 10 and as many as 200 Tiananmen activists remained in prison. The exact number was unknown because official statistics have never been made public.
   On March 4, labor activist and lawyer Yuan Xianchen was found guilty of “inciting subversion of state power” and sentenced to four years in prison and five years’ deprivation of political rights. Yuan was detained in May 2008 after publishing an article in Beijing Spring, a New York-based human rights journal. He was formally arrested in June 2008.
   Activist Huang Qi, a long-time campaigner for public recognition of Tiananmen victims, was arrested in June 2008 for possessing state secrets. On August 5, Huang was tried in Sichuan Province on charges of “illegal possession of state secrets,” and on November 24, he was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. Also in August activist Tan Zuoren went on trial for defaming the CCP, a charge allegedly linked to his work on social issues perceived by the government as sensitive. At year’s end no verdict had been issued in his case.
   Zhou Yongjun, a former Tiananmen Square student leader and foreign resident, was detained in September 2008 in Hong Kong while attempting to enter the country on a forged Malaysian passport in order to visit his ailing father. Although cleared by Hong Kong authorities of involvement in bank fraud, he was transferred to mainland authorities, detained in Shenzhen, and transferred to his hometown in Sichuan Province on the same financial charges. Zhou’s trial was held November 19, and at year’s end the case was awaiting a verdict.
   Many political prisoners remained in prison or under other forms of detention at year’s end, including rights activists Hu Jia and Wang Bingzhang; Alim and Ablikim Abdureyim, sons of Uighur activist Rebiya Kadeer; journalist Shi Tao; dissident Wang Xiaoning; lawyer and activist Yang Maodong (also known as Guo Feixiong); land-rights activist Yang Chunlin; Internet writer Xu Wei; labor activists Hu Mingjun, Huang Xiangwei, Kong Youping, Ning Xianhua, Li Jianfeng, Li Xintao, Lin Shun’an, Li Wangyang, and She Wanbao; CDP cofounder Qin Yongmin; family-planning whistleblower Chen Guangcheng; Catholic bishop Su Zhimin; Christian activist Zhang Rongliang; Inner Mongolian activist Hada; Uighur activist Dilkex Tilivaldi; and Tibetan Tenzin Deleg.
   Political prisoners obtained parole and sentence reduction much less frequently than ordinary prisoners. In January labor activist Yue Tianxiang was released from prison; he was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in 1999. On February 10, Uighur Tohti Tunyaz was released from prison after serving 11 years. Internet writer Yang Zili and labor activist Yao Fuxin were released from prison in March; both served their full sentences. On March 16, labor activist Yao Fuxin was released after serving his seven-year prison term on a conviction of “subversion of state power.” According to Human Rights in China, at year’s end Yao was under three years of deprivation of political rights, including the freedoms of speech, assembly, and association. On April 22, Tibetan Jigme Gyatso was released from detention.
   Criminal punishments continued to include “deprivation of political rights” for a fixed period after release from prison, during which time the individual is denied rights of free speech and association. Former prisoners sometimes found their status in society, ability to find employment, freedom to travel, and access to residence permits and social services severely restricted. Former political prisoners and their families frequently were subjected to police surveillance, telephone wiretaps, searches, and other forms of harassment, and some encountered difficulty obtaining or keeping employment, education, and housing.
   Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

   Courts deciding civil matters suffered from internal and external limitations on judicial independence. The State Compensation Law provides administrative and judicial remedies for deprivations of criminal rights, such as wrongful arrest or conviction, extortion of confession by torture, or unlawful use of force resulting in bodily injury. In civil matters prevailing parties often found it difficult to enforce court orders, and resistance to the enforcement sometimes extended to forcible resistance to court police.
   f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
   The law states that the “freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens are protected by law”; however, in practice authorities often did not respect the privacy of citizens. Although the law requires warrants before law enforcement officials can search premises, this provision frequently was ignored; moreover, the Public Security Bureau (PSB) and prosecutors can issue search warrants on their own authority without judicial consent, review, or consideration. Cases of forced entry by police officers continued to be reported.
   Authorities monitored telephone conversations, fax transmissions, e-mail, text messaging, and Internet communications. Authorities also opened and censored domestic and international mail. Security services routinely monitored and entered residences and offices to gain access to computers, telephones, and fax machines. All major hotels had a sizable internal security presence, and hotel guestrooms sometimes had concealed listening devices and were searched for sensitive or proprietary materials.
   Some citizens were under heavy surveillance and routinely had their telephone calls monitored or telephone service disrupted, particularly in the XUAR and Tibetan areas. The authorities frequently warned dissidents and activists, underground religious figures, former political prisoners, and others whom the government considered to be troublemakers not to meet with foreign journalists or diplomats, especially before sensitive anniversaries, at the time of important government or party meetings, and during the visits of high-level foreign officials. Security personnel also harassed and detained the family members of political prisoners, including following them to meetings with foreign reporters and diplomats and urging them to remain silent about the cases of their relatives.
   Family members of activists, dissidents, Falun Gong practitioners, journalists, unregistered religious figures, and former political prisoners were targeted for arbitrary arrest, detention, and harassment (see section 1.d.).
   Forced relocation because of urban development continued and in some locations increased during the year. Protests over relocation terms or compensation were common, and some protest leaders were prosecuted. In rural areas relocation for infrastructure and commercial development projects resulted in the forced relocation of millions of persons.
   The law prohibits the use of physical coercion to compel persons to submit to abortion or sterilization. However, intense pressure to meet birth limitation targets set by government regulations resulted in instances of local birth-planning officials using physical coercion to meet government goals. Such practices required the use of birth-control methods (particularly intrauterine devices and female sterilization, which according to government statistics accounted for more than 80 percent of birth-control methods employed) and the abortion of certain pregnancies.
   In February, according to international media reports, three women who were acting as surrogate mothers were reportedly forced to undergo abortions in a hospital in Guangzhou.
   In the case of families that already had two children, one parent was often pressured to undergo sterilization. The penalties sometimes left women with little practical choice but to undergo abortion or sterilization.
   Laws and regulations forbid the termination of pregnancies based on the sex of the fetus, but because of the intersection of birth limitations with the traditional preference for male children, particularly in rural areas, many families used ultrasound technology to identify female fetuses and terminate these pregnancies. National Population and Family-planning Commission regulations ban nonmedically necessary determinations of the sex of the fetus and sex-selective abortions, but some experts believed that the penalties for violating the regulations were not severe enough to deter unlawful behavior. According to government estimates released in February 2008, the male-female sex ratio at birth was 120 to 100 at the end of 2007 (compared with norms elsewhere of between 103 and 107 to 100).
   Several provinces–Anhui, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Hunan, Jilin, Liaoning, and Ningxia–require “termination of pregnancy” if the pregnancy violates provincial family-planning regulations. An additional 10 provinces–Fujian, Guizhou, Guangdong, Gansu, Jiangxi, Qinghai, Sichuan, Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Yunnan–require unspecified “remedial measures” to deal with unauthorized pregnancies.
   In July the Shanghai Population and Family-planning Commission announced plans to encourage couples to have a second child if both parents grew up as “only children.”
   Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
   a. Freedom of Speech and Press
   The law provides for freedom of speech and of the press, although the government generally did not respect these rights in practice. The government interpreted the CCP’s “leading role,” as mandated in the constitution, as superseding and circumscribing these rights. The government continued to control print, broadcast, and electronic media tightly and used them to propagate government views and CCP ideology. During the year the government increased censorship and manipulation of the press and the Internet during sensitive anniversaries.
   Foreign journalists were largely prevented from obtaining permits to travel to Tibet except for highly controlled press visits. While foreign journalists were allowed access to Urumqi during and after the July riots, authorities forced foreign journalists to leave other cities in the XUAR.
   Media outlets received regular guidance from the Central Propaganda Department (CPC), which listed topics that should not be covered, including politically sensitive topics. After events such as the July riots or the Sichuan earthquake, media outlets were told to cover the stories using content carried by government-controlled Xinhua and China Central Television. In the period preceding the October celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, authorities mandated that newspapers, magazines, and other news outlets minimize the reporting of negative stories.
   The General Administration of Press and Publication; the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, and the CPC remained active in issuing restrictive regulations and decisions constraining the content of broadcast media.
   As long as the speaker did not publish views that challenged the CCP or disseminate such views to overseas audiences, the range of permissible topics for private speech continued to expand. Political topics could be discussed privately and in small groups without punishment, and criticisms of the government were common topics of daily speech. However, public speeches, academic discussions, and speeches at meetings or in public forums covered by the media remained circumscribed, as did speeches pertaining to sensitive social topics. On May 10, 19 scholars held an unauthorized academic conference in Beijing to discuss the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. Some participants later received warnings from their employers to cease their participation in such events. Authorities also frequently intervened to halt public speeches and lectures on sensitive political topics.
   In March police detained Zhang Shijun, a former soldier who publicly expressed regret over his involvement in the Tiananmen uprising, for publishing an open letter to President Hu Jintao urging the CCP to reconsider its condemnation of the 1989 demonstrations. At year’s end his whereabouts remained unknown.
   In March and May, police interrogated and searched the home of Jiang Qisheng, Chinese PEN center vice president, author of a widely cited report on the Tiananmen uprising and an original signer of Charter 08.
   The government also frequently monitored gatherings of intellectuals, scholars, and dissidents where political or sensitive issues were discussed. Those who aired views that disagreed with the government’s position on controversial topics or disseminated such views to domestic and overseas audiences risked punishment ranging from disciplinary action at government work units to police interrogation and detention. In December 2008, to commemorate human rights day, a group of 303 intellectuals and activists released a petition entitled Charter 08, calling for human rights and democracy. Within one month more than 7,300 persons signed the petition, of whom police questioned at least 100. Many Charter 08 signers reported experiencing harassment during the year, especially around the time of sensitive anniversaries, trials, or official visits.
   The CPC continued to list subjects that were off limits to the domestic media, and the government maintained authority to approve all programming. Nearly all print media, broadcast media, and book publishers were owned by, or affiliated with, the CCP or a government agency. There were a small number of privately owned print publications but no privately owned television or radio stations.
   International media were not allowed to operate freely and faced heavy restrictions. In February two New York Timesreporters were detained for 20 hours after police stopped their car in a Tibetan area of Gansu Province. Authorities made the two spend the night in Lanzhou, the provincial capital, and eventually forced them to return to Beijing. In April reporters with the Voice of America (VOA) were detained for two hours in Sichuan Province before being told that they could not proceed farther. Local authorities first told them that it was illegal for tourists to visit the area and later told them they could not proceed because of “hazardous road conditions.”
   In May a Financial Times correspondent reporting in Mianzhu on families who lost children during the Sichuan earthquake was followed to an interview and attacked by unknown assailants who tried to take his camera. When police arrived, they also tried to take his video camera by force. Also in May on three separate occasions, foreign reporters were attacked while filming in Sichuan.
   Authorities barred foreign journalists from filming in, or entering, Tiananmen Square during the 20th anniversary of the crackdown on prodemocracy demonstrations. On July 10, police detained and deported an Associated Press photographer for taking pictures in Kashgar. In September police broke into the hotel room of three journalists fromKyodo News covering a National Day parade rehearsal, beat them, and destroyed their computers. On September 4, antiriot police beat three Hong Kong reporters in Urumqi. Five other Hong Kong reporters were briefly detained the same day in Urumqi to prevent them from filming protests.
   In July the Foreign Correspondent’s Club of China (FCCC) polled its members about reporting conditions following the 2008 Olympics. FCCC members reported 23 incidents of violence against reporters, sources, or assistants, along with multiple incidents of destruction of photographs or reporting materials, intimidation, and summoning for questioning by authorities. They also reported 100 incidents of being denied access to public spaces by authorities.
   The government refused to grant a visa to a foreign journalist who was planning to serve as the newspapers’ new bureau chief in Beijing.
   Authorities tightened restrictions on citizens working as assistants for foreign news bureaus. In February the government issued a code of conduct for news assistants of foreign correspondents. The code threatens dismissal and loss of accreditation if news assistants engage in “independent reporting” and instructs them to provide their employers with information that projects a good image of the country. The FCCC denounced the code of conduct as part of a government effort to intimidate news assistants.
   Officials can be punished for unauthorized contact with journalists. Editors and journalists continued to practice self-censorship as the primary means for the party to limit freedom of the press on a day-to-day basis. Official guidance on permitted speech was often vague, subject to change at the whim of propaganda officials, and retroactively enforced. Propaganda authorities can force newspapers to fire editors and journalists who print articles that conflict with official views and can suspend or close publications. The system of postpublication punishment encourages editors to take a conservative approach, since a publication could face enormous business losses if it were suspended for inadvertently printing forbidden content.
   Government officials used criminal prosecution, civil lawsuits, and other punishments, including violence, detention, and other forms of harassment, to intimidate authors and domestic journalists and block controversial writings. In June police arrested writer, former Tiananmen prisoner, and dissident Wu Gaoxing for publishing a letter asserting that former Tiananmen prisoners were facing economic hardships because of their past political troubles.
   A domestic journalist can face demotion or job loss for publishing views that challenge the government.
   Journalists who remained in prison included Lu Gengsong, Lu Jianhua, Huang Jinqiu, Cheng Yizhong, and Shi Tao. On February 10, Yu Huafeng was released from prison.
   Journalists and editors who exposed corruption scandals frequently faced problems with the authorities. In May officials in Hubei physically assaulted two reporters, Kong Pu from the Beijing Times and Wei Yi from the Nangfang People’s Weekly, as they researched a story of a waitress who killed a party official when he attempted to assault her.
   According to an official report, during the year authorities confiscated more than 65 million copies of pornographic, pirated, and unauthorized publications. Officials continued to censor, ban, and sanction reporting on labor, health, environmental crises, and industrial accidents. Authorities restricted reporting on stories such as the melamine milk scandal, schools destroyed during the Sichuan earthquake, and the July riots in Urumqi. Authorities also continued to ban books with content they deemed controversial.
   The law permits only government-approved publishing houses to print books. The State Press and Publications Administration (PPA) controlled all licenses to publish. No newspaper, periodical, book, audio, video, or electronic publication may be printed or distributed without the PPA and relevant provincial publishing authorities’ approval of both the printer and distributor. Individuals who attempted to publish without government approval faced imprisonment, fines, confiscation of their books, and other sanctions. The CCP exerted control over the publishing industry by preemptively classifying certain topics as off limits.
   Many intellectuals and scholars exercised self-censorship, anticipating that books or papers on political topics would be deemed too sensitive to be published. The censorship process for private and government media also increasingly relied on self-censorship and, in a few cases, postpublication sanctions.
   According to the PEN American Center, Korash Huseyin, former editor of the Uighur-language Kashgar Literature Journal, was released in 2008, but his whereabouts were unknown. Korash Huseyin, who was sentenced in 2004 to three years in prison for publishing a short story that authorities considered critical of CCP rule of Xinjiang, remained in prison serving a 10-year sentence.
   The authorities continued to jam, with varying degrees of success, Chinese-, Uighur-, and Tibetan-language broadcasts of the VOA, BBC, and RFA. English-language broadcasts on VOA generally were not jammed. Government jamming of RFA and BBC appeared to be more frequent and effective. Internet distribution of streaming radio news and podcasts from these sources often was blocked. Despite jamming overseas broadcasts, VOA, BBC, RFA, Deutsche Welle, and Radio France International had large audiences, including human rights advocates, ordinary citizens, and government officials.
   Television broadcasts of foreign news, which were largely restricted to hotels and foreign residence compounds, were occasionally subject to censorship. Such censorship of foreign broadcasts also occurred around the anniversary of the 1989 crackdown in Tiananmen Square. Individual issues of foreign newspapers and magazines were occasionally banned when they contained articles deemed too sensitive.
   Politically sensitive coverage in Chinese, and to a lesser extent in English, was censored more than coverage in other languages. The government prohibited some foreign and domestic films deemed too sensitive.
   Internet Freedom
   During the year the China Internet Network Information Center reported that the number of Internet users increased to 338 million, 94 percent of whom had broadband access. The government increased its efforts to monitor Internet use, control content, restrict information, block access to foreign and domestic Web sites, encourage self-censorship, and punish those who violated regulations, but these measures were not universally effective.
   The MPS, which monitors the Internet under guidance from the CPC, employed thousands of persons at the national, provincial, and local levels to monitor electronic communications. Xinhua News Agency reported that in 2008, authorities closed 14,000 illegal Web sites and deleted more than 490,000 items of “harmful” content from the Internet. In January the government began an “antivulgarity” campaign aimed at cracking down on “unhealthy information” on the Internet. In January official media claimed that the campaign had resulted in the closure of 1,250 Web sites and the deletion of more than 3.2 million items of information. Many Web sites included images of cartoon police officers that warn users to stay away from forbidden content. Operators of Web portals, blog-hosting services, and other content providers engaged in self-censorship to ensure their servers were free from politically sensitive content. Domestic Web sites that refused to self-censor political content were shut down, and many foreign Web sites were blocked.
   During the year major news portals, which reportedly were complying with secret government orders, began requiring users to register using their real names and identification numbers to comment on news articles. Individuals using the Internet in public libraries were required to register using their national identity card. Internet usage reportedly was monitored at all terminals in public libraries. Internet cafes were required to install software that allows government officials to monitor customers’ Internet usage. Internet users at cafes were oft

10. 2009年美國的人權紀錄–國新辦–3月12日

    2010年3月11日，美国国务院发表《2009年国别人权报告》，再次以“世界人权法官”自居，对包括中国在内的世界190多个国家和地区的人权状况进行指责，而对自身十分糟糕的人权纪录熟视无睹、回避掩饰。为了让世界人民了解真实的美国人权状况，我们发表《2009年美国的人权纪录》。

    　　一、关于生命、财产和人身安全

    　　美国社会暴力犯罪严重，公民的生命、财产和人身安全缺乏应有的保障。

    　　美国司法部2009年9月的报告显示，美国12岁以上公民2008年共经历490万起暴力犯罪，1630万起财产犯罪，13.7万起个人盗窃犯罪，其中暴力犯罪的发生率为每千人19.3起。(注1)除交通肇事外，2008年，美国共逮捕了1400多万名犯罪分子，其中每10万人有198.2人因暴力犯罪被捕。(注2)2009年，费城共发生了35起家庭凶杀案，比2008年同比增长67%。(注3)纽约市有记录的谋杀案为461起，平均10万人中的犯罪案为1151起。得克萨斯州的圣安东尼奥市平均10万人中的犯罪案为2538起，被认为是美国25座大城市中最危险的城市。(注4)2008年，人口低于10000人的城镇谋杀案上升了5.5%。(注5)美国每年发生在城市的谋杀案达15000起，主要集中在比较贫困的社区。(注6)

    　　美国私人拥有枪支数量居世界第一。美国联邦调查局及酒、烟和火器局统计显示，美国3.09亿人口拥有近2.5亿支枪，大部分拥有枪支的人都有1支以上的枪。美国人每年购买70亿发子弹，2008年上升到90亿发。(注7)美国法律允许飞机乘客经过申报后携带未装弹药的武器。

    　　在美国，每年约有3万人死于各类枪击事件。(注8)美国联邦调查局的报告显示，2008年，美国共有14180人死于枪杀案。(注9)罪犯在谋杀案、抢劫案和恶性攻击案中使用枪支等武器的分别占66.9%、43.5%和21.4%。(注10)《今日美国报》报道，2009年3月11日，麦克林顿在亚拉巴马州的两个镇杀害包括家属在内的10人后自杀。(注11)3月29日，罗伯特·斯图尔特在北卡罗来纳州穆尔县一所高级疗养院枪杀8人、打伤3人。4月3日，在纽约州宾厄姆顿市一家移民服务中心，42岁的王林发向正在上英语课的师生开枪射击，造成13人死亡，4人受伤。(注12)2009年，不断发生的袭警事件令人震惊。3月21日，加利福尼亚州奥克兰市一名26岁失业男子担心入狱，枪杀4名警员后被警方击毙。(注13)4月4日，波普瓦夫斯基在宾夕法尼亚州匹兹堡市开枪杀害3名警察。11月29日，减刑获释的莫里斯·克莱蒙斯在华盛顿州帕克兰一家咖啡馆枪击4名警察。(注14)

    　　枪击案蔓延到学校且不断升级，校园成为暴力犯罪的重灾区。美国传统基金会的报告表明，2007至2008学年，华盛顿特区11.3%的高中生曾在校园中经历过枪支等武器的威胁;华盛顿特区公校因遭遇暴力犯罪事件拨打急救电话900多次;(注15)新泽西州公校发生17666起暴力事件。(注16)纽约市立大学5所学院2006至2007年间发生恶性犯罪案件达107起。(注17)

    　　二、关于公民权利和政治权利

    　　美国政府限制、侵犯公民权利和政治权利的情况相当严重。

    　　美国警察施暴严重。据《芝加哥保卫者报》2009年7月8日报道，纽约市有315名警察因在执法过程中滥施暴力而受内部监管计划的监督。2007年，受监督的警察只有210人。过去两年来，纽约警察局因招致过多民众不满而接受内部审查的警察人数上升了50%。纽约警察局2009年11月17日的报告显示，纽约市警察2007年发射588发子弹，造成10人死亡;2008年发射354发子弹，造成13人死亡。(注18)2009年9月3日，4名警察用警棍、泰瑟枪殴打圣何塞州立大学学生胡方10次以上。(注19)9月22日，一名中国留学生在俄勒冈州尤金市遭一名警员无故殴打。(注20)据大赦国际统计，2009年1至10月，美国警方过度使用泰瑟枪导致45人死亡，死亡者中最小年龄15岁。从2001年到2009年10月，有389人因警方使用泰瑟枪致死。(注21)

    　　美国执法人员滥用职权。2009年7月，联邦调查局调查了首都华盛顿地区4名连续几年从当地毒贩开设的赌场收取保护费的警察。(注22)9月，芝加哥一名休班警察以巴士司机妨碍其自行车道为由对其进行殴打。(注23)同月，芝加哥警察局特别行动组4名前警察被指控以执行公务为名，用多种方式敲诈勒索犯罪嫌疑人近50万美元，并多次行贿上级主管。(注24)11月，乔治王子县一警察局前局长因私自贩卖缴获的盗窃枪支而被控有罪。(注25)在美国大城市，每年有100多万行人在街上被警察叫住盘查、询问、搜身和搜包，这个数字比几年前增长了很多。(注26)

    　　美国监狱人满为患。据美国司法部2009年12月8日报告，到2008年底，美国共有730万人被关押在监狱、看守所或处于缓刑或假释中，比2007年上涨了0.5%。(注27)其中，230万人在监狱服刑，即每198位美国人中就有1人在服刑。从2000至2008年，美国监狱人数平均每年上涨1.8%。(注28)由于加州监狱人满为患的压力和越来越差的财政状况，加利福尼亚州政府拟将上万名非法移民送往墨西哥的监狱。(注29)

    　　囚犯基本权利得不到保障。狱警强暴囚犯的现象普遍存在。美国司法部指出，在93家联邦监狱中，监狱工作人员对罪犯进行性侵犯的事件在过去8年中增加了一倍。在被指控对囚犯进行性虐待的90名监狱工作人员中，有40%的人还被判犯有其他罪行。(注30)据《纽约时报》2009年6月24日报道，通过对63000多名州和联邦监狱囚犯的调查显示，4.5%的囚犯在过去12个月内至少遭受一次性虐待,估计美国至少发生6万起针对囚犯的强暴案。(注31)

    　　监狱管理混乱，疾病蔓延。美国司法部的报告显示，2008年底，美国联邦和各州立监狱中共有20231名男性犯人和1913名女性犯人为艾滋病毒携带者，分别占男女囚犯的1.5%和1.9%。(注32)2007至2008年，加利福尼亚州监狱犯人的艾滋病毒携带者增加了246人，密苏里州增加了169人，佛罗里达州增加了166人。2007年，联邦和各州立监狱共有130多名犯人因艾滋病死亡。(注33)人权观察2009年3月的一份报告指出，纽约州监狱艾滋病毒携带者的人数大大多于其他大部分州，这些人无法得到相应治疗，甚至被分别关押，拒绝提供任何治疗。(注34)

    　　美国一方面在世界上极力兜售“言论自由”、“新闻自由”、“互联网自由”，另一方面却完全按照美国自己的利益和需要，不择手段地监控、限制公民的自由权利。

    　　美国公民接受、传播信息的自由受到严格监控。据报道，美国国家安全局早在2001年就在国内安装专门的窃听设备，监听电话、传真和电子邮件，收集国内的通讯信息。这一项目起初只是针对阿拉伯裔美国人，后来逐渐扩大到其他普通公民。在美国的密苏里州的圣何塞、圣地亚哥、西雅图、洛杉矶、芝加哥等地安装的监听设备超过25台。近日，美国国家安全局正耗资15亿美元在犹他州威廉姆斯营建立一个百万平方英尺的数据库，在圣安东尼奥建设另一个海量数据库，作为其新成立的网络司令部的重要组成部分。一位名叫诺基奥的人因拒绝加入该计划而被指控犯有19项内幕交易罪并被判处6年徒刑。(注35)

    　　“9·11”事件后，美国政府打着反恐的旗号，授权情报系统侵入公民的邮件通讯，并通过技术手段全面监控和强制删除网络中威胁美国国家利益的信息。根据美国《爱国者法案》，警察机关有权搜索电话、电子邮件通讯、医疗、财务和其他种类的记录;加强了警察和移民管理单位拘留、驱逐被怀疑与恐怖主义有关的外籍人士的权力。该法案延伸了恐怖主义的定义，扩大了警察机关可管辖的范围。2008年7月9日，美国参议院通过的新版窃听法案，给予参与窃听项目的电信公司法律豁免权，同时允许美国政府以反恐为由在未经法庭批准的情况下，可以对通信一方在美国境外的国际间通讯进行窃听。(注36)据统计，美国联邦调查局在2002至2006年间，通过邮件、便条和电话等渠道，窃取数千份美国公民的通讯记录。2009年9月，美国设立了负责互联网安全的监管部门，更加重了美国公民对政府会以维护互联网安全为由对私人系统进行干涉和监管的忧虑。美国一位政府官员在2009年4月接受《纽约时报》采访时承认，美国国家安全局近月来拦截和监听美国公民电子邮件和电话的行为已超越美国国会2008年设下的限制范围。除此之外，他们还秘密监听别国政治人物、国际组织官员、知名记者等的电话。(注37)美国军方也参与实施监控。据美国有线新闻网报道，总部设在弗吉尼亚州的美国军方网络风险评估机构，负责监控官方和非官方的个人博客、官方文件、私人联系信息、武器照片、军营入口以及其他“可能威胁国家安全”的网站。

    　　美国所谓的“新闻自由”，实际上完全服从于美国利益，是美国政府操控下的“自由”。据报道，美国政府和五角大楼曾有意安插一批退伍军官，在美国各大广播电视媒体担任评论员，以“军事专家”的身份，对伊拉克战争和阿富汗战争给出“积极评价”和分析，试图引导舆论，美化战争，让公众认同其“反恐”理念，从而获取支持。(注38)2009年底，美国国会通过一项法案，以传播反美内容、煽动暴力为由，对中东地区数家阿拉伯卫星电视频道进行制裁。(注39)2009年9月，在美国匹兹堡召开20国集团领导人会议时，反资本主义抗议者使用“推特”和手机短信组织群众集会，与警方发生几次冲突。41岁的艾略特·麦迪逊随后被控通过网络帮助抗议者逃避逮捕，警方还搜查了他的住所。(注40)宾夕法尼亚州美国公民自由联盟负责人维克·瓦尔扎克称，如果同样的事情发生在别的国家，就会被称为侵犯人权，但在美国，却被称为必要的预防犯罪措施。

    　　三、关于经济、社会和文化权利

    　　美国的贫困、失业、无家可归者等问题严重，劳动者的经济、社会、文化权利得不到保障。

    　　美国失业率创26年新高。受金融危机的影响，美国破产企业和个人数量不断上升。美联社2009年4月报道，过去12个月内美国申请破产保护的企业和个人总数近120万。过去一年中，每1000个美国人中就有4人申请破产，破产率是2006年的两倍。(注41)到2009年12月4日，受金融危机影响，美国共有130家银行被迫关闭。(注42)据美国劳工部11月6日公布的数据，美国2009年10月失业率达10.2%，有1600万人找不到工作，创1983年以来最高记录。(注43)失业超过半年的有560万人，占失业人数的35.6%。(注44)9月，年轻人的失业率高达25%，失业人数约为160万，是1948年有记录以来的最高水平。(注45)2009年3月7日结束的一周里，美国有547万人继续领取失业津贴，高于前一周的529万人。(注46)

    　　贫困人口创11年新高。《华盛顿邮报》2009年9月10日报道，2008年底，美国贫困人口达3980万人，比2007年增加260万人，占美国人口的13.2%，贫困率是1998年以来最高的一年。18至64岁贫困人口上升到2210万，比2007年增加17万人。陷入贫困的家庭占10.3%，达810万个。(注47)《纽约时报》2009年9月29日报道，2008年，纽约市贫困率为18.2%，近28%的布郎克斯区居民生活在贫困中。(注48)2008年8月至2009年8月，超过9万户加州贫困家庭被断电断气。密歇根州一名93岁的老翁也因断电断气冻死在家中。(注49)贫困导致美国自杀人数激增。据报道，美国每年约发生3.2万起自杀事件，几乎是1.8万起谋杀案的两倍。(注50)洛杉矶验尸官办公室的官员称，由于经济危机导致许多家庭无法负担丧葬费用。2008年，洛杉矶县有712具尸体无人认领，比上年增加36%。(注51)

    　　挨饿人口居14年来最高。美国农业部2009年11月16日报告称，2008年，美国有14.6%即1700万个家庭的4910万人在挨饿，比2007年的11.1%即1300万个家庭增加了31%，创1995年开始此项统计以来的最高纪录。(注52)对食物没有安全感的人从2007年的470万上升到2008年的670万。(注53)约15%的家庭还在为温饱而奋斗。(注54)据统计，2009年8月，美国有3650万人领取食物券，占总人口1/8，比2008年增加了710万。但只有2/3符合申请资格的人获得了食物券。(注55)

    　　劳动者权利受到严重侵害。《纽约时报》2009年9月2日报道，根据纽约、洛杉矶和芝加哥学者一项针对4387名低收入工人的调查发现，68%被调查的低收入者被克扣工资。在被迫加班的工人中有76%的人未得到相应的加班报酬，57%被调查者的工资收入没有依法足付证明。仅有8%因公负伤的人要求赔偿。26%的被调查者的工资收入低于全国最低工资标准。在抱怨工资收入及待遇问题的工人当中，43%的工人有被打击报复或被辞退的经历。(注56)《今日美国报》2009年7月20日报道，2007年，美国在工作场所死亡的人数为5657人，每天约有17人在工作中死亡，纽约州每年约有20万人在工作场所受伤或得病。(注57)

    　　没有医疗保险的人数连续8年增加。根据美国人口普查局2009年9月10日公布的数据，2008年，美国有4630万人无法获得医疗保险，占总人口比例的15.4%，比2007年的4570万人增加约60万人，是连续第8年增加。其中，18至64岁无医疗保险的人数从2007年的19.6%增加到2008年的20.3%。(注58)联邦基金的调查显示，2007至2009年，美国31个州18至64岁的成年人医疗保险范围缩小。(注59)成年人无医疗保险人口比率极高的州由1999年的2个增加到2009年的9个。得克萨斯州平均每4人中就有1人无医疗保险，居美国之首。(注60)休斯敦40.1%的居民无医疗保险。(注61)据统计，2008年，有2266名65岁以下的退伍军人因缺乏医疗保险或医疗服务而死亡，全国因无医疗保险死亡的退伍军人比在阿富汗战场上阵亡人数高出14倍。(注62)消费者联盟的一项调查显示，过去一年，34%的年收入5万美元以下家庭和21%的年收入10万美元以上家庭医疗保险丧失或遭到削减;2/3年收入5万美元以下的家庭和1/3年收入10万美元以上的家庭削减了医疗支出。28%的人生病不去就医;25%的人无法支付医疗或药品的费用;22%的人拖延实施医疗程序;20%的人有处方不买药或不做医疗检查;15%的人服用过期药物或为了省钱而不遵医嘱按时服药。(注63)经济合作与发展组织2009年12月8日发布报告称，2007年美国人均寿命仅为78.1岁，在经合组织成员国中居倒数第四位，而该年经合组织成员国的人均寿命为79.1岁。(注64)

    　　无家可归者激增。据统计，截至2008年9月，美国有160万人住进收容所，全家都在收容所的人数从2007年的47.3万增加到2008年的51.7万。(注65)2009年以来，芝加哥地区六个县的无家可归者有所增加，其中麦克亨利县增加最多，比上年增长了125%，这些家庭只能住在棚车等简易场所。(注66)2009年3月，加州州府萨克拉门托市形成了一个帐篷城，数百名无家可归者聚集在此。南加州的圣莫尼卡市不惜动用武力定期将无家可归者驱逐到市外。(注67)10月，底特律市的几千名无家可归者因担心领不到政府的住房补助而大打出手。(注68)12月，纽约市收容所有6975名无家可归的单身成人，这个数字不包括短期住所里的30698人、军队老兵和长期无家可归者。(注69)《休斯敦纪事报》2009年3月16日报道，2008年9月，加尔维斯顿大量房屋在艾克飓风中损毁，有数千灾民无法重返家园，约1700户家庭未得到救助，大都居无定所。(注70)

    　　四、关于种族歧视

    　　种族歧视至今仍是美国社会的一大痼疾。

    　　黑人和其他少数族裔是最贫困的美国人。据美国人口普查局公布的报告，2008年美国中等收入水平的家庭平均年收入50303美元，其中白人为55530美元，而拉美裔则为37913美元，相当于白人的68%;黑人仅为34218美元，相当于白人的61.6%。在同等学历和技能下，少数族裔的平均收入仅为多数族裔收入的60%—80%。(注71)据美国人口普查局发布的报告，2008年美国白人的贫困率为8.6%，而黑人、拉美裔人的贫困率分别为24.7%、23.2%，接近白人的3倍(注72)，还有1/4的印第安人生活在贫困之中。2008年没有医疗保险的拉美裔人达30.7%，黑人为19.1%，而白人为14.5%。(注73)根据美国住房和城市发展部的报告，截至2008年9月的财政年度内，在该部收到的10552起涉及住房投诉案中，种族歧视占35%。(注74)美国联邦疾病控制和预防中心的报告显示，非洲裔美国人只占美国人口的12%，却每年占美国新增艾滋病病毒感染者和因艾滋病死亡者的近一半。(注75)

    　　对少数民族的就业和职业歧视严重。在美国的失业大军中，少数族裔失业者首当其冲。据报道，2009年10月，美国平均失业率为10.2%，其中，黑人失业率上升到15.7%，西班牙裔人失业率上升到13.1%，而白人失业率为9.5%。(注76)16至24岁的黑人失业率达34.5%，超过美国平均失业率的3倍，创历史最高。有些城市的黑人失业率达到20%(注77)，有的印第安人部落失业率高达80%。(注78)据美国劳工统计局的统计，2009年，25岁以上的黑人男性大学毕业生的失业率是8.4%，接近白人男性大学毕业生失业率4.4%的2倍。(注79)据统计，2008年美国95000件职业歧视案中，近1/3为种族歧视案。(注80)据美国平等就业委员会称，已连续接到5起关于休斯敦一家石油天然气公司存在种族歧视行为的投诉。(注81)据报道，截至2009年5月底，黑人和西班牙裔人口各占纽约市人口的27%，但是由于纽约市消防部门不公正地排除有色人种担任消防队员，黑人消防队员仅占3%，西班牙裔消防队员占6%。(注82)

    　　少数民族在受教育方面受到歧视。据美国人口普查局的报告，33%的白人拥有大学学历，但黑人只有20%，拉美裔人只有13%。(注83)据报道，2003至2008年间，在向法学院递交申请的学生中，61%的非洲裔和46%的墨西哥裔学生遭到拒绝，而只有34%的白人学生遭到拒绝。(注84)非洲裔儿童仅占美国公立学校在校生的17%，但是被开除的数量却占被开除总数的32%。据北卡罗来纳大学和密歇根州立大学关于美国黑人少年对种族歧视看法的研究报告，大部分黑人少年认为自己是种族歧视的受害者。(注85)另据一项对休斯敦、洛杉矶和伯明翰5000名儿童的调查显示，20%的黑人儿童认为自己遭遇歧视，拉美裔儿童为15%。研究显示，种族歧视是导致少数族裔儿童精神疾病的重要原因。拉美裔儿童有抑郁症状的数量是其他族裔儿童的3倍，黑人儿童是其他族裔儿童的2倍。(注86)

    　　执法和司法领域的种族歧视非常明显。据美国司法部统计，截至2008年底，美国每10万黑人中有3161名男子和149名妇女被关押在监狱里。(注87)有25个州非洲裔青年被判处无假释终身监禁的比例是白人青年的10倍，在加利福尼亚州达18倍。在美国各大城市，每年有超过100万行人在大街上被警察叫住盘查，近九成是少数族裔男子，其中五成为非洲裔人，三成为拉丁裔人，而被检查的白人只有一成。(注88)纽约市警察局发布的报告显示，2008年纽约市警察针对黑人和拉美裔人开枪的比例分别为75%和22%，而针对白人开枪的比例则为3%。(注89)据人权观察发布的报告，1980至2007年，美国全国范围内黑人因毒品犯罪而被拘捕的比例是白人的2.8到5.5倍。(注90)

    　　“9·11”事件以来，对穆斯林的歧视加剧。一家研究中心发布的一项联合调查显示，58%的美国人认为穆斯林遭受到“很大的”歧视。18至29岁的年轻人中有73%的人认为穆斯林是最受歧视的群体。(注91)

    　　移民境遇悲惨。据大赦国际美国分会发表的报告，美国每年拘留30多万非法移民，平均每天在押的移民超过3万人。(注92)同时，每年有数以百计的合法移民被拘禁、拒绝入境甚至押送出境。(注93)据“宪法项目”研究小组和人权观察联合发布的一份报告，从1999至2008年，有140万名被拘留的移民被转移，原在洛杉矶和费城生活多年的上万名移民被强行移送到遥远的得克萨斯州或路易斯安那州移民监狱。(注94)纽约市律师协会2008年10月接到关押在曼哈顿瓦里克拘留所100名男性移民的求援信，描述了拘留所的拥挤、肮脏、缺医少药、挨饿、每天做工只有1美元报酬的境遇。(注95)一些哺乳期的母亲被关押后因为被拒绝提供吸奶器，导致伤风、乳腺炎和丧失哺乳能力。(注96)2003年10月以来在移民与海关执法局关押中死亡的移民达104人。(注97)

    　　种族仇恨犯罪频发。美国联邦调查局2009年11月23日公布的仇恨犯罪统计显示，2008年，美国共发生仇恨犯罪7783起，其中51.3%是基于种族歧视，19.5%基于宗教偏见，11.5%基于国别歧视。(注98)在种族仇视案件中，70%以上是针对黑人的。2008年，针对黑人的暴力犯罪达每千人26人，针对白人的数字是每千人18人。(注99)2009年6月10日，白人至上主义者和新纳粹分子布伦在华盛顿纳粹大屠杀遇难者纪念馆枪杀黑人保安约翰斯，打伤2人。(注100)据美国南方贫困问题法律中心公布的报告，纽约州萨福克县种族不容忍和民族仇恨的氛围造成过去10年间发生很多起白人攻击拉美裔移民事件。(注101)

    　　五、关于妇女、儿童权利

    　　美国妇女儿童生存状况每况愈下，妇女儿童的权利得不到应有的保障。

    　　妇女不享有与男子平等的社会政治地位。美国女性人口占总人口的51%，但是在目前第111届美国国会中，男议员有441名，女议员只有92名，占17%，其中参议员17名，众议员75名。(注102)一项研究表明，少数族群和妇女很少能在美国的大型慈善机构和非营利机构中身居要职，妇女仅占非营利机构首席执行官总人数的18.8%，在世界500强企业中只占3%。在美国400个最大的慈善机构中，所有文化组织、医院、公共事务团体、犹太人联盟或其他宗教组织中没有一个是由妇女领导的。(注103)

    　　妇女就业难、收入低、生活贫困。据美国平等就业委员会统计，2008年该委员会共收到就业方面的指控95402件，比上年提高了15%，其中基于性别方面就业歧视的指控继续占很高比例。(注104)美国人口普查局2009年9月公布，美国全职妇女2008年的年均收入为35745美元，全职男子的年均收入为46367美元，女性收入为男性的77%，低于2007年的78%。(注105)据美联社报道，一名已在沃尔玛工作10年的女药剂师因为要求获得与男同事相同的薪酬于2004年被解雇。(注106)到2008年底，有420万个单亲女性家庭生活贫困，比率达28.7%。(注107)美国有6400万工作年龄的妇女没有医疗保险或医疗保险额太少、支付账单有困难或欠交医疗费甚至放弃治疗，占工作年龄妇女总数的70%。(注108)

    　　妇女频遭暴力和性侵害。据报道，美国强奸发生率比英国高13倍，比日本高20倍，居世界最高。(注109)2009年3月，圣迭戈地区连续发生5起尾随妇女入室抢劫并且对受害人施以性侵害的案件。(注110)据美国国防部发布的一份研究报告，截至2008年财政年度，美军方共接到2900多起军队内部强奸和其他性侵犯案件，比上一年增加9%，而这些案件中只有292起案件被提交到军事法庭。报道称，此类案件的实际数字可能是举报数字的5到10倍。(注111)据路透社报道，根据对40个服役美国女兵的深度采访，其中10人被强奸，5人被性侵犯，还有13人被猥亵。(注112)

    　　美国儿童饥寒交迫。据美国农业部公布的报告，2008年，占美国儿童总数1/4的1670万儿童得不到足够食物。(注113)美国食物救济机构“喂养美国”公布的一份报告称，美国有350万名5岁以下儿童经常挨饿或营养不良，占儿童总数的17%以上，其中有11个州挨饿儿童比例超过20%，路易斯安那州达到24.2%。(注114)美国贫困人口中18岁以下的儿童占1/3以上。据美国人口普查局公布的数据，到2008年底，美国15.7%的18岁以下儿童生活在贫困中，人数从2007年的1330万上升到1410万。(注115)据报道，2005至2006年间，美国每年有150多万儿童无家可归，每50名儿童中就有一人无家可归。在无家可归的儿童中，42%不到6岁，大多数是非洲裔和印第安人。(注116)2008年美国有近1/10的儿童得不到医疗健康保险。据报道，2008年，美国有730万儿童没有医疗保险;占美国儿童的9.9%，内华达州有20.2%的儿童没有保险。(注117)2009年8月13日，加州风险管理医疗保险委员会投票通过决议，从2009年10月起终止6万多名贫困家庭儿童的“健康家庭”医疗保险;到2010年6月底前，将取消67万名贫困家庭儿童的“健康家庭”医疗保险。(注118)霍普金斯医学院儿童中心的一项研究表明，过去20年来，由于缺乏医疗保险，导致约1.7万名美国儿童死亡。(注119)美国疾病控制与预防中心说，自2009年4月甲型H1N1流感暴发至10月间，美国约800万名18岁以下的儿童染病，其中540人死亡。(注120)

    　　儿童生活在暴力和恐惧中。据报道，2008年，美国共有1494名18岁以下的儿童被杀。(注121)纽约市卫生局2009年6月16日公布的一份报告显示，2001至2007年间，美国1至12岁儿童死亡率为10万分之20，其中谋杀死亡率为10万分之1.3。(注122)美国司法部2008年1至5月的一项对4549名17岁以下儿童的调查表明，60%以上的美国儿童在过去一年中直接或间接遭受暴力侵犯，近一半被调查儿童至少受过一次攻击，约6%的儿童受到性侵犯，13%的儿童挨过打。(注123)2002年以来，得克萨斯州至少有1227名儿童因受虐待或照顾不周而死亡。(注124)据美国研究机构和公共卫生媒体的研究报告显示，美国每年有1/3离家出走或者被赶出家门的孩子靠出卖肉体换取食物、药品和居所。司法系统不再把他们当作年幼的受害者，而是把他们当作青少年罪犯。(注125)

    　　农业大量使用童工。据一个儿童权益保护组织披露，美国约有40万儿童从事合法的农业工作。据美国农场工人就业培训计划主席戴维斯·斯特劳斯称，数十年以来一直有年龄低于8岁的儿童从事此类工作，而且他们在工作过程中使用的是锋利的劳动工具和危险性极高的农药。该机构领导委员会主席厄尼·弗洛里斯表示，美国因从事农业工作而死亡的人口中有20%是儿童。(注126)美国的一项劳动标准法允许13岁以上儿童在炎炎烈日下长时间进行农业劳动，却不允许他们坐在配有空调的办公室里工作，甚至不准在快餐店里打工。

    　　美国是世界上唯一不对少年犯适用假释的国家。从1985至2002年，被关押的青少年增加44%。很多孩子仅犯有轻微违法行为，却没有得到律师的帮助。许多检察官、公诉人和法官对于发生在少年监狱的虐待视而不见。

    　　六、关于侵犯他国人权

    　　美国凭借强大的军事实力，在国际上推行霸权主义，粗暴侵犯他国主权，肆意践踏他国人权。

    　　美国作为全球最大的军火销售国，加剧世界各地不稳定。美国的军费世界第一。据报道，美国军费在2008年又增加了10%，达到6070亿美元，占世界军费的42%。(注127)据美国国会的一份报告显示，在2008年全球武器销量创下4年来新低的时候，美国对外军售总额却从上一年的254亿美元猛增到378亿美元，增长了约50%，占当年全球军售总量的68.4%。(注128)2010年伊始，美国政府不顾中国政府和人民的强烈抗议，宣布对台湾出售总价值近64亿美元先进武器的军售计划，严重损害中国国家安全利益，引起中国人民的强烈愤慨。

    　　伊拉克战争和阿富汗战争不仅给美国人民增加了沉重的负担，更给伊拉克和阿富汗两国人民的生命财产造成了巨大损失。伊拉克战争已给伊拉克造成逾百万平民死亡、逾百万人无家可归以及巨大财产损失。在阿富汗，美军滥杀无辜的事件至今仍然不断发生。2009年8月5日，5名正在货车上搬运黄瓜的阿富汗农民在美军发动的空袭中丧生。(注129)美国国防部2009年6月8日表示，美军在2009年5月5日在打击塔利班时，没有遵守适当的方法和程序，造成阿富汗平民死亡。阿富汗官方目前已收集到了147名遇害平民的姓名，其中包括妇女和儿童，而美国指挥官则称死亡人数不超过30人。(注130)

    　　虐囚是近年来美国在人权领域的最大丑闻之一。2009年，联合国人权理事会反恐中保护人权及基本自由问题特别报告员在向人权理事会第10届会议提交的报告中称，美国创造了一套全面的特别递解、长期和秘密拘留以及违反联合国禁止酷刑公约的做法。该报告员在提交第64届联大的报告中指出，美国及其私人承包人对在伊拉克和其他地方关押的男性穆斯林使用了强迫堆叠裸体男囚、强迫与其他被拘留者进行同性性行为、强迫赤身裸体等审讯手段。(注131)美国中央情报局自2002年就开始使用酷刑手法审讯犯人。美国政府2009年3月2日证实，中央情报局自2001年以来销毁的92盘有关审讯恐怖犯罪嫌疑人的录像带中有12盘录像带记录了使用酷刑的画面。(注132)根据近期公布的秘密报告，中央情报局使用手枪和电棒审讯犯人。(注133)根据美国公布的一系列司法部秘密文件，执法者可以将犯人以站立姿势铐住达180小时，十多个中央情报局的犯人被剥夺睡眠最少48小时，有3人被剥夺睡眠超过96小时，其中一人为近8天的时间，另一人被剥夺睡眠11天。(注134)据报道，中央情报局审讯人员曾经对“9·11”事件的主要谋划者哈立德·谢赫·穆罕默德使用了183次水刑，并对“基地”组织的另一名军事领导人阿布·祖贝达使用83次水刑。(注135)关塔那摩监狱如同人间地狱。据被释放的关塔那摩监狱囚犯穆罕默德称，他在美国中央情报局喀布尔秘密监狱和关塔那摩等监狱遭到了“中世纪般的”拷打。(注136)据美国《哈泼斯杂志》和全美广播公司2009年联合进行的调查，2006年6月被指“自杀”的3名关塔那摩监狱囚犯很可能是在同一个晚上接受审讯时窒息而死，当局却对外宣称他们是上吊自杀。(注137)在关塔那摩监狱被关押达8年之久的索马里人穆罕默德·萨莱班·巴雷说：“那里是人间地狱。我的狱友们有的眼睛看不见了，有的胳膊、腿没了，有的精神失常”。(注138)2009年，被关押在关塔那摩监狱的一名31岁的也门人长期绝食后身亡。自2002年起已有5人死亡，其中4人自杀。(注139)美国政府在阿富汗巴格拉姆空军基地关押了600多名囚犯。联合国2009年2月出台的一份报告点名批评巴格拉姆监狱说，有些人在巴格拉姆被关押了5年之久。已经获释的一些被关押者声称他们遭受了严刑拷打，甚至性侵犯。一些人还称他们曾经被关在有15至20个人的笼子里，有两名关押者在监禁期间死亡，死因可疑。(注140)另据美国司法部的调查，有2000名塔利班投降士兵被由美军控制的阿富汗武装塞进卡车中窒息死亡。(注141)

    　　美国在世界各地设立军事基地，侵犯当地人民人权的事件屡见不鲜。目前，美国在世界上有900处军事基地，基地中有超过19万名士兵和11.5万名相关工作人员。这些基地给当地造成了巨大的破坏和环境污染，炸弹爆炸产生的有毒物质给当地儿童造成巨大的伤害。据报道，在苏比克和克拉克美军基地，已经有约3000件美军士兵强奸当地妇女的案件被提交，但是都被法院裁定不予受理。(注142)

    　　美国对古巴进行长达近50年的经济、商业和金融封锁，给古巴带来了超过930亿美元的直接经济损失。2009年10月28日，第64届联大以187票支持，3票反对、2票弃权的压倒性多数第18次通过《必须终止美利坚合众国对古巴的经济、商业和金融封锁》决议，要求美国立即结束对古巴的封锁。(注143)

    　　美国打着“互联网自由”的旗号，推行霸权主义。美国垄断着世界互联网的战略资源。互联网自诞生之日起就由美国牢牢掌控，目前全球互联网根服务器有13台，其中唯一的主根服务器在美国，其余12台辅根服务器中有9台在美国。所有根服务器均由美国政府授权的ICANN(国际互联网名称和编号分配公司)统一管理，负责全球互联网根域名服务器、域名体系和IP地址等的管理。世界各国和联合国等国际组织都曾要求打破美国对互联网根服务器的垄断，分享互联网的管理权，但是均遭美国拒绝。美国利用其对互联网资源的垄断地位，通过各种形式干涉别国内政。美国建有专门的黑客部队，并在全球范围内招募黑客精英为其服务。2009年夏天，伊朗发生总统选举骚乱，选举失利的伊朗改革派阵营及其支持者利用“推特”等网络工具发布大量信息。美国国务院要求“推特”运营商推迟系统升级计划，以帮助反对派制造舆论声势。当年5月，某网络公司也曾按照美国政府的授意，切断了古巴等五国的MSN即时通讯服务端口。

    　　美国建立名为“梯队”的窃听系统，对全球进行窃听。欧洲议会的报告书指出，“梯队”系统作为一个由美国操纵的情报收集分析网络，能够在全球范围内拦截以公众电话交换网络、卫星及微波通讯所传送的电话、传真、电子邮件和其他数字资讯，并监控其中的内容。欧洲议会曾点名批评美国利用“梯队”系统从事犯罪活动，如侵犯一般平民的隐私权或国家性质的商业间谍活动，其中最有名的是沙特阿拉伯60亿美元客机案。(注144)英国王妃戴安娜生前提倡全球反地雷运动，与美国的政策相抵触，她的电话因此被监听了。《华盛顿邮报》报道说，美国政府的这种间谍行动不禁让人想起了当年越战期间美国政府对国内反战派人士进行监视窃听的行为。

    　　美国漠视国际人权公约，消极对待国际人权义务。美国于32年前签署《经济、社会和文化权利国际公约》，于29年前签署《消除对妇女一切形式歧视公约》，但迄今均未批准。美国还没有批准《残疾人权利公约》。2007年9月13日，第61届联大表决通过的《土著人民权利宣言》，是迄今联合国通过的保护土著人民权利的最权威和全面的文件，美国依然拒绝承认该宣言。

    　　以上事实说明，美国不仅国内人权纪录十分糟糕，而且是世界许多人权灾难的主要根源。长期以来，美国将自己凌驾于其他国家之上，充当“世界人权警察”，无视自身存在的严重的人权问题，年复一年地发表国别人权报告对别国进行指责，将人权作为干涉别国内政、丑化别国形象和谋取自己战略利益的政治工具，充分暴露了美国在人权问题上的双重标准，理所当然地遭到世界各国人民的坚决反对和强烈谴责。特别是在全世界人民正遭受由美国次贷危机引发的国际金融危机导致的严重人权灾难的时候，美国政府仍不正视自身存在的严重人权问题，而热衷于谴责别国，这是十分令人遗憾的。我们奉劝美国政府汲取历史教训，摆正自己的位置，着力改善自身人权状况，改正在人权领域的所作所为。

    　　注释：

    　　(注1)Criminal Victimization2008，U.S. Department of Justice, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov

    　　(注2)Crime in the United States, 2008, http://www.fbi.gov

    　　(注3)《纽约时报》，2009年12月30日。

    　　(注4)《侨报》，2009年12月30日。

    　　(注5)http://www.usatoday.com，2009年6月1日。

    　　(注6)http://www.reuters.com，2009年10月7日。

    　　(注7)《侨报》，2009年9月25日。

    　　(注8)http://review.usqiaobao.com，2009年4月6日。

    　　(注9)《今日美国报》，2009年9月15日。

    　　(注10)http://www.thefreelibrary.com

    　　(注11)《今日美国报》，2009年3月11日。

    　　(注12)《纽约时报》，2009年4月4日。

    　　(注13)http://cbs5.com

    　　(注14)《纽约时报》，2009年12月1日，2日，3日。

    　　(注15)A Report of The Heritage Center for Data Analysis, SchoolSafety in Washington, D.C.: New Data for the 2007—2008School Year, http://www.herigage.org

    　　(注16)根据新泽西州教育局2009年10月发布的公校系统暴力和故意伤害年度报告，http://www.state.nj.us

    　　(注17)《纽约邮报》，2009年9月22日。

    　　(注18)http://gothamist.com，2009年11月17日。

    　　(注19)http://www.mercurynews.com，2009年10月27日。

    　　(注20)《俄勒冈人报》，2009年10月23日，http://blog.oregonlive.com

    　　(注21)http://theduckshoot.com

    　　(注22)《华盛顿邮报》，2009年7月19日。

    　　(注23)《芝加哥论坛报》，2009年9月，http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com

    　　(注24)《芝加哥论坛报》，2009年9月19日。

    　　(注25)《华盛顿邮报》，2009年11月18日。

    　　(注26)http://www.huffingtonpost.com，2009年10月8日。

    　　(注27)http://www.wsws.org

    　　(注28)http://mensnewsdaily.com，2010年1月18日。

    　　(注29)http://news.yahoo.com，2010年1月26日。

    　　(注30)《华盛顿邮报》，2009年9月11日。

    　　(注31)《纽约时报》，2009年6月24日。

    　　(注32)http://www.news-medical.net，2009年12月2日。

    　　(注33)http://thecrimereport.org，2009年12月2日。

    　　(注34)www.hrw.org，2009年3月24日。

    　　(注35)http://onlinejournal.com, 2009年11月23日。

    　　(注36)《纽约时报》，2008年7月10日。

    　　(注37)《纽约时报》，2009年4月15日。

    　　(注38)《纽约时报》，2009年4月20日。

    　　(注39)http://blogs.rnw.nl

    　　(注40)http://www.nytimes.com，2009年10月5日。

    　　(注41)http://www.floridabankruptcyblog.com

    　　(注42)《芝加哥论坛报》，2009年12月4日。

    　　(注43)《纽约时报》，2009年11月7日。

    　　(注44)《纽约时报》，2009年11月13日。

    　　(注45)《华盛顿邮报》，2009年9月7日。

    　　(注46)http://247wallst.com，2009年3月19日。

    　　(注47)《华盛顿邮报》，2009年9月11日。

    　　(注48)《纽约时报》，2009年9月29日。

    　　(注49)http://www.msnbc.msn.com

    　　(注50)http://www.time.com

    　　(注51)《洛杉矶时报》，2009年7月21日。

    　　(注52)《纽约时报》，2009年11月17日;14.6% of Americans Could Not Afford Enough Food in 2008，《大西洋商业频道》。

    　　(注53)美国生命科学网站，2009年11月26日。

    　　(注54)美联社，2009年11月27日。

    　　(注55)http://www.associatedcontent.com

    　　(注56)《纽约时报》，2009年9月2日。

    　　(注57)《今日美国报》2009年7月20日。

    　　(注58)http://www.census.gov

    　　(注59)路透社，2009年10月8日。

    　　(注60)http://www.ncpa.org

    　　(注61)http://www.msnbc.msn.com

    　　(注62)法新社，2009年11月11日。

    　　(注63)http://www.oregonlive.com

    　　(注64)http://www.msnbc.msn.com

    　　(注65)《今日美国报》，2009年7月9日。

    　　(注66)《芝加哥论坛报》，2009年10月28日。

    　　(注67)http://www.truthalyzer.com

    　　(注68)《今日美国报》，2009年10月8日。

    　　(注69)《纽约时报》，2009年12月10日。

    　　(注70)《休斯敦纪事报》，2009年3月16日。

    　　(注71)《华尔街日报》，2009年9月11日;《今日美国报》，2009年9月11日。

    　　(注72)《纽约时报》，2009年9月29日。

    　　(注73)Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2008,www. Census.gov

    　　(注74)《华盛顿邮报》，2009年6月10日。

    　　(注75)《华尔街日报》，2009年4月8日;美国联邦疾病控制和预防中心2009年发表的报告。

    　　(注76)《今日美国报》，2009年11月6日。

    　　(注77)《华盛顿邮报》，2009年12月10日。

    　　(注78)《侨报》，2009年11月6日。

    　　(注79)《纽约时报》，2009年12月1日。

    　　(注80)美联社，2009年4月27日。

    　　(注81)美联社，2009年11月18日。

    　　(注82)《纽约时报》，2009年7月23日。

    　　(注83)美国人口普查局，2009年4月27日，http://www.census.gov

    　　(注84)《纽约时报》，2010年1月7日。

    　　(注85)《科学日报》，2009年4月29日。

    　　(注86)《今日美国报》，2009年5月5日。

    　　(注87)www.ojp.usdoj.gov

    　　(注88)《侨报》，2009年10月9日。

    　　(注89)《纽约时报》，2009年11月17日。

    　　(注90)www.hrw.org，2009年3月2日。

    　　(注91)http://www.washingtontimes.com，2009年9月10日。

    　　(注92)《世界日报》，2009年3月26日。

    　　(注93)《星岛日报》，2009年4月13日。

    　　(注94)《纽约时报》，2009年11月2日。

    　　(注95)《纽约时报》，2009年11月2日。

    　　(注96)www.hrw.org，2009年3月16日。

    　　(注97)《华尔街日报》，2009年8月18日。

    　　(注98)www.fbi.gov

    　　(注99)victim characteristics，2009年10月21日, http://www.fbi.gov

    　　(注100)《华盛顿邮报》，2009年6月11日;《华尔街日报》，2009年6月11日。

    　　(注101)《纽约时报》，2009年9月3日。

    　　(注102)Members of the 111th United States Congress，维基百科。

    　　(注103)《华盛顿时报》，2009年9月20日。

    　　(注104)www.eeoc.gov，2009年11月3日。

    　　(注105)《华尔街日报》，2009年9月11日;www.census.gov，2009年9月10日。

    　　(注106) 美联社，2009年10月5日。

    　　(注107) http://www.census.gov，2009年9月10日。

    　　(注108)《侨报》，2009年5月12日。

    　　(注109)Occurrence of rape，http://www.sa.rochester.edu

    　　(注110)《星岛日报》，2009年3月14日。

    　　(注111)美国哥伦比亚广播公司晚间新闻，2009年3月17日。

    　　(注112)路透社，2009年4月16日。

    　　(注113)《华盛顿邮报》，《今日美国报》，2009年11月17日。

    　　(注114)www.feedingamerica.org，2009年5月7日。

    　　(注115)www.census.gov，《华盛顿邮报》，2009年9月11日。

    　　(注116)CNN.com，MSNBUC.com，2009年3月10日。

    　　(注117)http://www.census.gov，《华盛顿邮报》，2009年9月21日。

    　　(注118)《洛杉矶时报》，《侨报》，2009年8月14日。

    　　(注119)《公共卫生杂志》，2009年10月30日。

    　　(注120)《今日美国报》，《华尔街日报》，2009年11月13日。

    　　(注121)《今日美国报》，2009年10月8日。

    　　(注122)http://www.nyc.gov

    　　(注123)美联社，2009年10月7日。

    　　(注124)《休斯敦纪事报》，2009年10月22日。

    　　(注125)《侨报》，2009年10月28日。

    　　(注126)西班牙《起义报》，2009年10月14日。

    　　(注127)美联社，2009年6月9日。

    　　(注128)路透社，2009年9月6日。

    　　(注129)http://www.rawa.org

    　　(注130)《费城问讯报》，2009年6月9日。

    　　(注131)《华盛顿邮报》，2009年4月7日。

    　　(注132)《华盛顿邮报》，2009年3月3日。

    　　(注133)《华盛顿邮报》，2009年8月22日。

    　　(注134)http://www.chron.com

    　　(注135)《纽约时报》，2009年4月20日。

    　　(注136)法新社伦敦，2009年3月7日电。

    　　(注137)英国《卫报》网站，2010年1月18日。

    　　(注138)法新社索马里哈尔格萨，2009年12月21日电。

    　　(注139)《纽约时报》，2009年6月3日。

    　　(注140)美国国际新闻社纽约2009年2月25日电。

    　　(注141)http://www.yourpoliticsusa.com，2009年7月16日。

    　　(注142)http://www.lexisnexis.com，2009年5月17日。

    　　(注143)Overwhelming International Rejection

    　　of US Blockade of Cuba at UN，www.cubanews.ain.cu

    　　(注144)维基百科。

    　　(新华社北京3月12日电)

11. 吼吼，英國人也出人權報告了。

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